“It’s hard to be believed when you say you understand what people are giving up this week to pay a bill when you have an investment property,” writes political columnist ANDREW HUGHES. 

So many election campaigns in Australia come down to who got their messaging better. Sometimes the impact of good policy is lost through poor messaging. 

Plagiarism being as rife as it is in the supposed thought areas of our society means that, thankfully, some of the better ideas are adopted and then rebranded by the victors in an election. 

A good example being the GST, originally pushed for by Keating in the Accord deals in the 1980s, finally got over the line thanks to Howard in 2000. 

That aside, campaign 2025 will be a good case study in how to message in the modern era. So here are five insights that may guide future campaigns. 

• Start early, understand the context

Some facts. Most Australians aged under 55 have on average seven social media accounts and spend several hours weekly on them. That ticks into double figures for Gen Z. Our lives are busier than ever with longer commutes and working hours. Throw in other responsibilities and whatever time is left is probably just an hour or two a day. 

Then you can add pre-existing attitudes towards politics and politicians in Australia, usually for many a turn off. This makes messaging even more difficult. Let alone in a 33-day campaign timeframe. 

You have to start early. At least three big policies should be out there in the last six months before the election so people have time to hear, think about, and then act on them. It also shows you are engaged and listening, especially as you can then alter the policy to tighten it up based on feedback. 

There are disadvantages to this, as Labor found out when they started to play around with considering changing negative gearing in a policy document, all a mistake, of course. Right? 

• Numbers and actions matter 

The Coalition were far too slow in adjusting their strategy to the numbers this election. The moment Dutton started to dip on preferred PM and net approval ratings they should have switched away from him and on to policies. 

Making the product the star of the show is what commercial marketers have done so well for so long, think iPhone. Yet the Coalition were stuck on using an unpopular leader in messaging that lacked impact and engagement. 

The numbers were there even before the campaign kicked off that the teal independents were holding firm because the Coalition had little to offer the moderate right. Again, strategy should have been adjusted early on as a leader who had so wanted to seem in touch with his softer side, now came across as uncompromising and rigid. 

• Aspiration and hope

Both sides offered only hints in terms of aspiration and hope. We got dialled down versions of a MAGA strategy. And yet Australian political history shows the effectiveness of this strategy. Think Howard’s Battlers, Latham’s Ladder, Turnbull’s Harborside Mansion withering speech on Shorten. 

An example. Imagine if the Coalition had announced a $15 billion Home Building scheme, where those who qualify could purchase a one, two or three-bedroom home built by the government at a fixed price. On resale 25 per cent of the profit would then be paid back to keep the scheme operating. Targeting those in housing stress regardless of age or electorate because it is such a widespread issue now. 

Visualise that announcement being made by a Coalition leader, ideally someone like an Jacinda Ardern progressive mode. Labor may have been gone. 

• The dual campaign

Labor ran a near textbook dual campaign. That is the positive, brand building, one, and then the brand-destroying one using negative content to target Dutton and the Coalition. 

The positive worked on solid certainties that would happen. Perfect in a macro environment of uncertainty and risk. Tangibles were communicated simply and cleanly using retail terms. 

The negative built into the existing perception of Dutton being conservative and strong, framing that as Trumpist (again nod to macro events), uncertain, and traditional. 

They ran a balance on traditional and new media, a safe strategy and one which meant that the Coalition had to claw back momentum by increased risk taking in messaging and policy once voting started on April 22. 

Why the Coalition didn’t run a harder negative campaign focusing on Labor failings on supermarket powers, gambling ads, changes to negative gearing and super, and weaknesses on immigration deportations and white collar crime is a mystery. 

• The leader and candidates

Both parties have issues here. Gen Z should have been better represented in candidate selection by both parties. The teals, Greens, and indies showed how that’s done – special nod to you, Hannah Vardy, here in the ACT. 

Both leaders’ profiles impacted cut through on cost-of-living issues. It’s hard to be believed when you say you understand what people are giving up this week to pay a bill when you have an investment property.
Parties need to start rebuilding now and selecting leaders from Gen Y, but I doubt that will happen. Marles or Chalmers in 2028 would face a serious campaign threat from a progressive Gen Y Liberal. I doubt that will happen, too. It should. 

Are there more lessons? Absolutely. But articles are like elections – you quickly run out of time and space. 

Dr Andrew Hughes lectures at the ANU Research School of Management, where he specialises in political marketing.